Market segmentation in two-sided markets : tv rights for premier league by Kind, Hans Jarle & Sørgard, Lars
E t  s e l s k ap  i  NHH -m i l j ø e t
S A M F U N N S -  O G  
N Æ R I N G S L I V S F O R S K N I N G  A S
I n s t i t u t e  f o r  R e s e a r c h  i n  E c o n o m i c s  
a n d  B u s i n e s s  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n
A r b e i d s n o t a t
W o r k i n g  P a p e r31/12
Market segmentation in
two-sided markets:
TV rights for Premier League 
Hans Jarle Kind
Lars Sørgard
SNF
Samfunns- og  
næringslivsforskning AS 
- er et selskap i NHH-miljøet med 
oppgave å initiere, organisere og utføre 
eksternfinansiert forskning. Norges 
Handelshøyskole, Universitetet i Bergen 
og Stiftelsen SNF er aksjonærer. 
Virksomheten drives med basis i egen 
stab og fagmiljøene ved NHH og 
Institutt for økonomi (UiB).
SNF er Norges største og tyngste forsk-
ningsmiljø innen anvendt økonomisk-
administrativ forskning, og har gode 
samarbeidsrelasjoner til andre forsk-
ningsmiljøer i Norge og utlandet. SNF 
utfører forskning og forskningsbaserte 
utredninger for sentrale beslutnings-
takere i privat og offentlig sektor. 
Forskningen organiseres i programmer 
og prosjekter av langsiktig og mer 
kortsiktig karakter. Alle publikasjoner 
er offentlig tilgjengelig.
SNF
Institute for Research 
in Economics and Business 
Administration 
- is a company within the NHH group. 
Its objective is to initiate, organize and 
conduct externally financed research. 
The company shareholders are the 
Norwegian School of Economics and 
Business Administration (NHH), the 
University of Bergen (UiB) and the SNF 
Foundation. Research is carried out by 
SNF´s own staff as well as faculty 
members at NHH and the Department of 
Economics at UiB.
SNF is Norway´s largest and leading 
research environment within applied 
economic administrative research. It has 
excellent working relations with other 
research environments in Norway as 
well as abroad. SNF conducts research 
and prepares research-based reports for 
major decision-makers both in the 
private and the public sector. Research 
is organized in programmes and 
projects on a long-term as well as a 
short-term basis.  All our publications are 
publicly available.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper No 31/12 
 
Market segmentation in two-sided markets:  
TV rights for Premier League 
by 
Hans Jarle Kind 
Lars Sørgard 
 
 
 
 
SNF project 9031 
“Improving competition policy” 
 
The project is financed by the Research Council of Norway 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 
BERGEN, DECEMBER 2012 
ISSN 1503-2140 
 
 
 
 
 
© Dette eksemplar er fremstilt etter avtale med 
KOPINOR, Stenergate 1, 0050 Oslo. 
Ytterligere eksemplarfremstilling uten avtale 
og i strid med åndsverkloven er straffbart og 
kan medføre erstatningsansvar. 
© Materialet er vernet etter åndsverkloven. Uten 
uttrykkelig samtykke er eksemplarfremstilling som 
utskrift og annen kopiering bare tillatt når det er 
hjemlet i lov (kopiering til privat bruk, sitat o.l.) eller 
avtale med Kopinor (www.kopinor.no) 
Utnyttelse i strid med lov eller avtale kan medføre 
erstatnings- og straffeansvar. 
Hans Jarle Kindand Lars Sørgardy
Market segmentation in two-sided markets: TV rights for
Premier Leaguez
Abstract
This paper analyzes market segmentation in a two-sided market
that consists of media consumers and advertisers. The analysis is
motivated by a European Court of Justice Decision in October 2011,
which allowed viewers to take advantage of international price di¤er-
ences and buy access to Premier League TV matches from whichever
country they like. We compare complete market segmentation with
the new situation where consumers can purchase from abroad (allow-
ing for passive sales). Clearly, such a change is likely to harm Premier
League, which at present is sold at di¤erent prices to viewers in di¤er-
ent countries. More surprisingly, we nd that all viewers - including
those that switch to purchasing from abroad - might also be harmed.
We further show that the two-sidedness of the market may break down
in the country that attracts foreign viewers.
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JEL Classication: D43, K21, L13
Norwegian School of Economics (NHH); email: hans.kind@nhh.no.
yNorwegian School of Economics (NHH); email: lars.sorgard@nhh.no
zThanks to Marc Bourreau, seminar participants at the OECD technical workshop on
two-sided markets in Paris on December 7 2011, at BECCLE (Bergen Center for Com-
petition Law and Economics) January 5 2012, EARIE conference in Rome September 4
2012, 10th workshop for media economics in Bogota on October 19 2012 and the seminar
at Tilburg University (TILEC) January 25 2013 for helpful comments.
1
SNF Working Paper No 31/12
1 Introduction
Karen Murphy - a pub landlady in England - switched her Premier League
subscription from an English satellite distributor to the Greek distributor
Nova, and the price dropped from £ 7000 to £ 800.1 The Premier League
brought the case to the European Court of Justice, but Karen Murphy won
and was allowed to continue purchasing from the foreign distributor.2 The
decision reects that market segmentation in the form of denying consumers
to buy from abroad may be in conict with the idea behind EUs Common
Market and with EUs competition law. In this paper we show that a ban
on market segmentation in a two-sided market (of which a TV program that
is nanced by both viewer payments and advertising revenues is a prime
example) might be detrimental to welfare, and actually harm all consumers,
including those who would like to purchase from abroad.
Market segmentation, for example televised transmission of Premier League
sold to viewers at di¤erent prices in di¤erent countries, is an example of third
degree price discrimination. The consequences of such price discrimination
in one-sided markets are analyzed in detail in the existing literature.3 For
example, Varian (1985) has shown that a necessary condition for third de-
gree price discrimination to increase total welfare is that output increases.
Unfortunately, this insight cannot guide us in two-sided markets, where it is
crucial to capture the interaction between the price setting on the two sides
of the market.4 In the Premier League case, for instance, we need to take into
1See, for example, The Telegraph: Premier League braced for European
Court of Justice ruling on selling of lucrative television rights, online Octo-
ber 3 2011 on http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/competitions/premier-
league/8805350/Premier-League-braced-for-European-Court-of-Justice-ruling-on-selling-
of-lucrative-television-rights.html
2See judgements in case C-403/08 (Football Association Premier League and Others v
QC Leisures and Others) and case C-429/08 (Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services
Ltd. A later decision by a UK court was interpreted by Premier League as if their business
practice is legal. See the UK court ruling of February 3 2012, that delivered its judgment
on an ECJ ruling relating to a company called QC Leisure, a provider of Greek and Arabic
decoder cards to publicans in the UK. On February 24 2012 the high court ruled in Karen
Murphys favour, although they stated that many issues had to be settled at a later date.
See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-17150054.
3For surveys of the literature, See Varian (1989), Stole (2006) and Armstrong (2008).
4The importance of the interaction between the two sides of the market is clearly
shown in the existing literature. See for example Evans (2003a, 2003b), Rochet and Tirole
(2003) and Weyl (2010) for a general analyis, and for example Anderson and Coate (2005),
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account the interrelationship between the consumer side and the advertiser
side of the market.
The starting point for our analysis is a situation with third degree price
discrimination between two countries. We call this regime, where we assume
that consumers cannot purchase the product we consider from abroad, com-
plete segmentation. To make it interesting, we set up the model such that
there is a price di¤erence between the countries. Formally, we assume that
in the more expensive country there is both a consumer group with low price
elasticity and a consumer group with a high price elasticity, while in the other
country there is only a consumer group with high price elasticity.
The seller can earn revenue only from consumers (one-sided market), only
from advertisers, or from both consumers and advertisers (two-sided market).
If there is advertising, we assume that it is tailored to domestic consumers.
This implies that if a consumer watches a foreign TV channel, then he will
be of no value to the rms that advertise on that channel.5
We compare the complete segmentation regime with what we call a no
segmentation regime, where we allow consumers to purchase the product
from abroad if that is cheaper. This is in line with the EU court decision we
have referred to. It is also in line with the EU competition law guidelines on
vertical restraints concerning passive sales, where any restrictions imposed by
an upstream rm on the downstream rm concerning consumerspurchasing
from a neighboring territory will be regarded as a violation of a hardcore
restriction.6 On the other hand, EU competition law allows the upstream
rm to place restrictions on the downstream rmsactive sales. This means
that the upstream rm can force its distributors not to sell actively in other
places than their own exclusive territory, and thus not compete for consumers
Anderson and Gabszewicz (2006), Barros et al. (2004), Gabszewicz et al. (2004) and Kind
et al. (2007, 2009) for an analysis of the media market.
5This is a simplication; what matters for our results is that domestic consumers gen-
erally are more valuable than foreign consumers for the advertisers.
6Passive sales is dened as responding to unsolicited requests from individual cus-
tomers coming from another territory (see Guidelines for Vertical Restraints, 2010/C
130/01, par. 51). See Commission Regulation 330/2010, art. 4(b), where it is stated that
if an upstream rm imposes an exclusive territory on a downstream rm with restrictions
on passive sales then this is outside the block exemption and must therefore be regarded
as a hardcore restriction. It indicates that it is likely that it would be a violation of the
competition law (article 101 in the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union) if
an upstream rm put restrictions on a downstream rms passive sales.
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from a neighboring territory.7 We take seriously the EU competition law
rules by (i) allowing individual consumers to switch to a foreign distributor
(allowing passive sales), and (ii) by prohibiting the distributors in the two
countries to compete for each othersconsumers (prohibiting active sales).
As a benchmark, we consider the consequences of shifting from complete
to no segmentation in a one-sided market. We do so by assuming that the
TV channels only rely on consumer payment (no advertising revenue). Since
it is the most price sensitive consumers who switch to the low-price country,
we arrive at the standard result that the price will increase in the country
with the highest initial price. Assuming that those who switch are of the
same type as the consumers in the low-price country, the price there will not
change.
We contrast these predictions with those in a corresponding model with
a two-sided market. The consumers will then pay a direct price for viewing,
as in a one-sided market, and, in addition, an indirect price because they
are interrupted by ads (it is well documented that viewers generally consider
TV ads as a nuisance).8 The consumersgeneralised price is the sum of the
direct and the indirect price. In the no segmentation regime we assume that
a non-loyal consumer will switch if he observes a lower generalised price in
the other country.
We nd that the direct prices increase in both countries following a shift
to no segmentation. It is straight forward to understand why this happens in
the high-price country; its most price sensitive viewers now buy from abroad.
These viewers are clearly valuable to the foreign TV channel, but they do
not generate any advertising revenue. Once we open up for international
trade, direct consumer payment thus becomes relatively more important for
the TV channel in the low-price country. The initial motive for setting a
relatively low direct price - attracting consumers and thereby increasing rev-
enues from advertisers - is therefore dampened in the low-price country. It
will consequently increase the direct price and reduce the advertising volume.
7This is a restriction on active sales, which means actively approaching individual
customers, in a neighboring terrritory. The upstream rm can impose restrictions on
the downstream rms active sales and still be part of the block exemption regulation for
vertical restraints (see Guidelines for Vertical Restraints, 2010/C 130/01, par. 51, as well
as Commission Regulation 330/2010, art. 4b). This indicates that an upstream rm that
imposes restrictions on a downstream rms active sales is probably not violating Article
101 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union.
8See for example Danahar (1995) and Moriarty and Everett (1994).
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The advertising level in the country that loses viewers will in contrast
increase. This might seem surprising, since demand for advertising is higher
the greater is the size of the audience, other things equal. The explanation
for this result hinges on the fact that consumers tend to dislike ads on TV.
However, when only the most loyal viewers remain, the channel can increase
the advertising level without risking that too many viewers stop watching
TV.
Since both the direct and the indirect price increase in the high-price
country, the generalised price in this country must necessarily increase too.
In addition, we show that the generalised price increases in the low-price
country as well (the increase in the direct price outweighs the reduction in
the indirect price). This is in contrast to a corresponding model with a
one-sided market, where prices increase only in the high-price country.
The inow of viewers to the low-price country means that a share of
its audience will be of no value to the advertisers in this country. This
mismatch in the advertising market implies that a shift from complete to no
segmentation may lead to a shift from a two-sided to a one-sided market in
the low-price country. This is true if the gain from advertising is su¢ ciently
low. The TV channel in the low-price country will then switch to being
nanced only by consumer payment, which is obviously detrimental to the
advertisers in the low-price country.
An interesting nding, not least from a policy point of view, is that a
shift from complete to no segmentation can be detrimental to total welfare
- the sum of consumer surplus and prots in the two countries. Even more
interestingly, prices may increase so much that those who would like to switch
will be worse o¤ if they are allowed to buy from the cheaper country. As long
as each non-loyal consumer reacts to any price di¤erence by switching, and
there is no coordination among the consumers, this will emerge as a prisoners
dilemma outcome. This is in sharp contrast to standard predictions. It
reects the fact that market segmentation may be e¢ ciency-enhancing in
two-sided markets.
There are articles discussing price discrimination in two-sided markets, see
for example Callauid and Jullien (2003), Armstrong (2006) and Liu and Serfes
(2010). But none of these consider third degree price discrimination or allow
for a shift from complete to no market segmentation. This implies that they
do not capture the potential mismatch between consumers and advertisers,
on which we focus. Moreover, some of their results are qualitatively di¤erent
from ours. For example, Liu and Serfes (2010) nd that price discrimination
5
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leads to higher prices while we nd the opposite.
Our main issue is how international trade might lead to a mismatch in
two-sided markets. Jeon, Jullien and Klimenko (2012) study a similar issue.
However, their focus is very di¤erent from ours, since their main concern
is how the dominance of English web content may a¤ect the production of
web content in a non-English home language. Another important di¤erence
is that while they analyze potential mismatch between consumers and the
content providers, we concentrate on potential mismatch between consumers
and the advertising market.
The article is organized as follows. In the next section we present the
model, and we report the results of a shift from complete to partial seg-
mentation in a one-sided market. In section 3 we present a two-sided market
model and derive the e¤ects of a shift from complete to partial segmentation.
In section 4 we present a model where demand is specied explicitly, and in
section 5 we o¤er some concluding remarks and comment on the optimal
public policy concerning market integration.
2 Some preliminaries
Let us consider a model where a media product is sold in two countries,
Country 1 and Country 2. The product could for instance be a televised
transmission of Premier League soccer games; hereafter labelled TV program.
The program is aired by TV1 in Country 1 and TV2 in Country 2.9
Consumers are heterogenous concerning their willingness to pay for watch-
ing the TV program, and each consumer buys either one or zero units. It
is not possible to charge di¤erent prices from di¤erent consumers within a
country (no domestic price discrimination). We assume that there are two
types of consumers, group A and group B: The countries have the same
number of group A consumers. Abstracting from other factors that inuence
demand, we thus have CA1 (p) = C
A
2 (p) and @C
A
1 =@p = @C
A
2 =@p < 0, where
CAi denotes the number of consumers in group A who watch TV channel i,
and p denotes the viewer price. These consumers may switch to purchasing
the product from the other country if they are allowed to do so. We call
9In reality, there might be an upstream agent that produces the content and sells this
to the consumers through a TV channel. We do not model the relationship between the
content provider and the TV channel. One interpretation of our model is that the content
provider and the TV channel in each country write e¢ cient contracts.
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these consumers the non-loyals.
Consumer group B exists only in Country 1. These consumers are not
willing to switch to purchasing from abroad, and we call them the loyals.
Let "ki denote (the negative of) the price elasticity of demand for group k in
country i, where i = 1; 2 and k = A;B, dened as "ki    (@Cki =@pi)(pi=Cki ).
We assume that "A1 > "
B
1 , which means that consumer demand in group A
is more price elastic than in group B. We further dene the price elasticity
for the total market in each of the countries as "1 and "2 (hereafter labelled
average elasticities). Since Country 2 has only type A consumers, we have
"2 = "Ai.
In addition to the revenue they raise from the consumer charges, the TV
channels can also earn revenue from the advertising market. If both adver-
tisers and viewers are on board, this is a two-sided market. Consistent with
empirical evidence, we assume that advertising is a nuisance to the viewers
(and for simplicity we let the nuisance costs be identical for all consumers).
The number of viewers at TV channel i thus depends negatively on the viewer
price and on the advertising level, Ai: Letting Ci denote the total number of
viewers at TV channel i; we thus have that Ci (pi; Ai) is decreasing in both
its arguments. Note that if no-one watches the foreign TV channel, we have
C1 = C
A
1 + C
B
1 and C2 = C
A
2 :
The commercials are tailored towards the countriesdomestic consumers,
implying that foreign consumers have no value on the advertising market
(this is not crucial; what is important for our analysis is that foreign viewers
are worth less than domestic viewers for the advertisers). With a downward-
sloping demand curve, the advertisersdemand for commercial time thus de-
pends negatively on the price ri they pay per slot and positively on the num-
ber of domestic viewers, CiL; @Ai (ri; CiL) =@ri < 0 and @Ai (ri; CiL) =@CiL >
0: We assume that all domestic consumers are equally valuable for the ad-
vertisers.
We may now write prots for the TV channel in Country i as
i = piCi (pi; Ai) + riAi (ri; CiL)   () ; (1)
where the cost function  ()  0 may depend both on the ad level and on
the number of viewers. The TV channel maximizes prots with respect to
the advertising price ri and the viewer price pi.
We compare two regimes. In the rst regime the TV channels segment the
markets completely by not allowing a consumer in one country to purchase
7
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from the other country (complete segmentation). In the second regime we
allow the non-loyals to buy from the country with the lowest total viewer
price (free trade).
Since we assume homogeneity concerning each viewers nuisance cost, we
can easily see that - all else equal - the price sensitivity on the viewer side is
decisive for the viewer price:
Remark 1: All else equal, pi > pj if "j > "i:
Furthermore, assuming that Ai(ri; CiL) is invertible, it follows that be-
cause @CiL=@pi < 0 we also have10:
Remark 2: @ri=@pi < 0:
The intuition for Remark 2 is simply that a higher viewer price lowers
the number of viewers, which in turn reduces the willingness to pay for ads.
3 General results
3.1 Benchmark: One-sided markets (pure pay-TV)
For comparison, let us rst consider the case with A1 = A2 = 0. This
is the case with revenues only from the consumer side of the market, and
therefore no two-sidedness. Solving @i=@pi = 0 yields the standard rst-
order condition that marginal revenue is equal to marginal costs:
@i
@pi
=

Ci + pi
@Ci
@pi
  @
@pi

= 0 (2)
With complete segmentation, the consumers are forced to purchase their
product in their own country. Since the consumers in Country 1 on average
have a lower price elasticity of demand than the consumers in Country 2, it
is optimal to set pA=01 > p
A=0
2 :
We compare complete segmentation with a regime where the distributors
still sell actively only in their own country, but where the consumers are
allowed to switch to the distributor in the neighboring country. The latter,
called a no segmentation regime, is in line with the EU court decision on
10This assumption is met in many two-sided models for the media market, see for ex-
ample Kind et al. (2009).
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Premier League and the existing competition law rules (allowing passive sales
and at the same time imposing restrictions on active sales). By assumption,
only the non-loyals will consider doing this, and since pA=01 > p
A=0
2 it follows
that non-loyals in Country 1 switch to Country 2.
Since the consumers switching from Country 1 to Country 2 are identical
to those in Country 2, there will be no change in the price elasticity of
demand and thus no change in the viewer price in Country 2. In Country
1 the remaining consumers, the loyals, are by denition less price elastic
("B1 < "A1). This leads to a higher viewer price in Country 1.
Summing up, we have the following result:
Proposition 1 Assume revenues only from the consumer side. Then a
shift from complete segmentation to no segmentation leads to a higher viewer
price in Country 1 and has no e¤ect on the viewer price in Country 2.
A direct implication of this proposition is that
Corollary 1 Assume that there is a shift from complete segmentation
to no segmentation, and revenues only from the consumer side. The loyal
consumers in Country 1 then lose, while the non-loyals in Country 1 gain.
Consumers in Country 2 are not a¤ected (no price change).
3.2 Two-sided markets
Let us now assume that the TV channels are nanced by revenues from both
viewers and advertisers. The subjective cost of watching TV then depends
on the monetary viewer price pi as well as on the non-monetary (indirect)
costs of being interrupted by ads. Denoting the latter by f(Ai) > 0; with
f 0(Ai) > 0; we follow the convention in the media economics literature and
dene the generalized viewer price in Country i as
gi = pi + f(Ai):
The total (subjective) viewer cost per program is thus equal to the sum of
the monetary and the non-monetary price.
The monetary viewer price will be lower in a two-sided market compared
to the benchmark case. To show this, let us consider the rst-order conditions
for the optimal advertising and viewer prices in Country i:
9
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@i
@pi
=

Ci + pi
@Ci
@pi
  @
@pi

+ ri
@Ai
@CiL
@CiL
@pi| {z }
 
= 0 (3)
@i
@ri
=

Ai + ri
@Ai
@ri
  @
@ri

+ pi
@Ci
@Ai
@Ai
@ri| {z }
+
= 0 (4)
The term in the square bracket of (3) is equal to zero in a one-sided
market, c.f. equation (2). The term outside the bracket captures the fact
that a higher viewer price reduces the number of viewers and thus also the
demand for ads. This term is therefore negative, making it clear that the
viewer price will be relatively low in a two-sided market.
The interpretation of (4) is similar; if the viewers were indi¤erent to the
ad-level, the advertising price should be set such that the term in the square
bracket is equal to zero. However, the last term in equation (4) implies that
the optimal advertising price is higher than this, because a higher advertising
price reduces the advertising level such that the non-monetary viewer price
falls. This in turn increases the number of viewers.11
Let us now consider how the viewer price pi changes when we have a
two-sided market and we shift from complete segmentation to a situation
where consumers can switch (no segmentation). Let pi denote viewer price
in Country i with complete segmentation, and pi the corresponding price
under no segmentation. We use similar notations for the other variables.
Note that due to the low price elasticity for the loyals, the generalized price
under complete segmentation will be higher in Country 1 than in Country 2;
g1 > g

2:
Let us now assume the following:
Assumption 1: g1  g2 :
Given this assumption, it is protable for a non-loyal to switch. As we
shall see below, the generalized price in Country 1 with no segmentation will
typically be strictly higher than that in Country 2 if all non-loyals switch,
but will hold with equality if only a share of them do so.
If Assumption 1 is satised, we have:
11This is robust nding in the literature on two-sided media markets. See Anderson and
Gabszewicz (2006), which is a survey of the literature on models for the media market.
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Proposition 2 Assume revenues from both the advertising and the con-
sumer side. Then a shift from complete to no segmentation increases the
viewer prices in both countries; pi > p

i .
Proof: Since the viewer price will be lower in a two-sided market than in
a one-sided market, we have pA=02 > p

2 under complete segmentation: Sup-
pose that TV2 could price discriminate between foreign and domestic con-
sumers. It would then charge pA=02 from the foreign viewers and p

2 from
the domestic ones. As this is not possible, it follows straight forwardly that
pA=02 > p

2 > p

2. In Country 1, at least a share of the non-loyals buy from
abroad. The price elasticity of demand in the relevant market in Country 1
has thus decreased, so with prot maximizing prices we have p1 > p

1.
We further have:
Proposition 3 Assume revenues from both the advertising and the con-
sumer side. Then a shift from complete to no segmentation increases the
generalized price in Country 1 ( g1 > g

1) and reduces the advertising volume
in Country 2 (A2 < A

2).
The proof and intuition for why g1 > g

1 are the same as for why p

1 > p

1;
since the most price sensitive consumers in Country 1 buy from abroad in a
no segmentation regime, it is optimal for the TV channel in this country to
increase both the monetary and the generalized viewer price. The intuition
for why A2 < A

2 follows from the discussion above; by reducing the adver-
tising volume, the TV channel in Country 2 can increase the monetary viewer
price. This is optimal, since the viewers from Country 1 do not generate any
advertising revenue.
To see formally that A2 < A

1, note that since only domestic viewers have
any value on the ad market, the term in the square bracket of (4) for Country
2 is independent of whether TV2 has any foreign viewers. However, for each
unit increase in the advertising level, the number of viewers falls more when
the channel also serves foreign non-loyals;
@(CA2 +CA1 )@A2
 > @CA2@A2 . Since more-
over we have p2 > p

2; the term outside the bracket in (4) is unambiguously
larger under no segmentation than under complete segmentation. Thus, the
advertising price in Country 2 will be higher (r2 > r

1) and the advertising
level lower (A2 < A

1) in the no segmentation regime.
We also set up the following conjecture:
11
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Conjecture 1 Assume revenues from both the advertising and the con-
sumer side. Then a shift from complete to no segmentation might increase
the generalized price in Country 2 ( g2 > g

2) and the advertising volume in
Country 1 (A1 > A

1).
The claim that g2 > g

2 is intuitive; since the switchers from Country
1 are valueless on the advertising market in Country 2, there is less reason
for the TV channel in that country to attract a large audience in order to
increase advertising revenue. Thus, it is optimal to set a higher generalized
price, which means that the increase in p2 dominates over the reduction in
the ad level (i.e. g2 = p2 +A2 > 0).
At rst sight the claim that A1 > A

1 might seem counter-intuitive; when
the size of the audience falls, it becomes less attractive to advertise. Other
things equal, this results in a lower advertising volume. However, since the
remaining viewers in Country 1 - the loyals - are less price sensitive than those
who have left, we might nonetheless expect that it is optimal to increase both
the monetary (p1) and the non-monetary (A1) viewer price in that country.
4 A specic model
The relationships stated in Conjecture 1 cannot be proved to hold for any
demand system, but below we provide an illustration of the mechanisms
through a specic model. We also analyze in some detail the welfare impli-
cations of a shift from market segmentation to free trade, and in particular
whether the non-loyals might be worse o¤ if they are allowed to purchase from
the foreign country. This possibility cannot be disregarded if the generalized
viewer prices increase in both countries.
4.1 Market segmentation
Suppose for the moment that the consumers are prohibited from making
their purchases abroad, such that the markets are completely segmented.
Let demand from consumer group A in Country i = 1; 2 be given by CAi =
1  pi  Ai; where the positive parameter  measures the viewersdisutility
of ads. We normalize by setting  = 1 :
CAi = 1  pi   Ai: (5)
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Demand from consumer group B, which exists only in Country 1, is likewise
given by
CB1 =    p1   A1: (6)
To capture the assumption that these consumers on average are less price
elastic than those in Group A, we assume that  > 1 (the price elasticity is
strictly decreasing in ).
Since the platforms are unable to price discriminate between the groups,
it is clear that TV1 will choose to serve only group B if  is su¢ ciently
high. However, for our purpose the most interesting case is the one where no
consumer group is excluded, so we assume that  is su¢ ciently low to ensure
that this holds. The conditions for this to be true, and some consequences
of allowing higher values on ; are discussed in the Appendix.
Without loss of generality, we assume that there is only one advertiser
in each country. Let the prot function for the advertiser in Country 1 and
Country 2, respectively, be given by
1 =


 
CA1 + C
B
1
  r1A1 and 2 =  CA2   r2A2; (7)
where ri is the advertising price in Country i = 1; 2: The parameter  > 0 in
(7) scales the gain from advertising; the higher is ; the more valuable it is
to expose the viewers to ads.
Solving @i=@Ai = 0; subject to (5) and (6), we nd that the prot
maximizing advertising levels are given by
A1 =
( + 1)  2p1
4
  r1
4
and A2 =
1  p2
2
  r2
2
: (8)
For simplicity we set the TV channelscosts equal to zero, such that their
prot levels equal
1 = p1(C
A
1 + C
B
1 ) + r1A1 and 2 = p2C
A
2 + r2A2: (9)
Each TV channel maximizes prots with respect to the prices it charges
in the viewer and advertising markets, pi and ri: It can be shown that the
second-order conditions require that X1  6 2 1 > 0; which means that
we must have  2  3  2p2; 3 + 2p2  (0:17; 5:82) : Assuming that this is
true, we nd the rst-order conditions
p1 =
( + 1)  (3  )
2X1
; p2 =
p1
 + 1
and (10)
r1 =
( + 1)  ( + 1)
X1
; r2 =
r1
 + 1
:
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Using equation (8) and that gi = Ai + pi we further have
A1 =
( + 1) (   1)
2X1
; A2 =
2A1
 + 1
and (11)
g1 =
 + 1
4
 
1  (   1)
2
X1
!
; g2 =
2g1
 + 1
:
Not surprisingly, we see that the generalized price in Country 1 is increas-
ing in group Bs willingness to pay for watching TV; dg1=d > 0. Equation
(11) also reveals that the ad level is positive if and only if  > 1; for smaller
values of  the willingness to pay for ads is so low that the TV channels prefer
to be advertising-free and only charge the viewers. If   3, on the other
hand, the willingness to pay for ads is so high that the TV channels maxi-
mize prots by not charging the viewers at all. Thereby they attract large
audiences, and make high prots from the advertising side of the market.
We can now state:
Lemma 1 The TV channels are nanced by a combination of advertising
and viewer payments if the markets are completely segmented and  2 (1; 3) :
From equations (10) and (11) we further note:
Lemma 2 Both the direct and the indirect price are higher in Country
1 than in Country 2 ( p1 > p2; A1 > A2) if the markets are completely
segmented and  2 (1; 3) :
Since the generalized price (gi = pi + Ai) is unambiguously higher in
Country 1 than in Country 2, group A consumers in Country 1 are worse
o¤ than their identical counterparts in Country 2. This indicates that these
consumers would benet from being allowed to make their purchases from
Country 2.
4.2 No market segmentation
The analysis above presupposed that consumers are not allowed to purchase
from the foreign country. Suppose now that they are allowed to do so. Since
g1 > g

2; a share s 2 (0; 1] of the non-loyals in Country 1 will nd it benecial
14
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to buy from Country 2. Total demand for watching TV in Country 1 will
then be equal to D1 = (1  s)CA1 + CB1 ; while in Country 2 we have D2 =
sCA1 + C
A
2 : The prot functions for the TV channels, 1 = p1D1 + r1A1 and
2 = p2D2 + r2A2; are consequently given by
1 = p1 [(1  s) (1  p1   A1) + (   p1   A1)] + r1A1 and (12)
2 = p2 [s (1  p2   A2) + (1  p2   A2)] + r2A2:
Since only domestic viewers matter for the advertisers we further have
1 = f [(1  s) (1  p1   A1) + (   p1   A1)]  r1gA1 and (13)
2 = [ (1  p2   A2)  r2]A2:
The TV channel and the advertiser in Country 1 lose revenue if (some
of) the non-loyals buy from Country 2 rather than from their home country.
As noted above, this loss is not likely to be fully counterweighted by higher
revenues for the rms in Country 2, since the switchers by assumption are of
no value in the foreign advertising market.
In the Appendix we show that the rst-order conditions for prot maxi-
mization in the no segmentation regime are given by:
p1 =
[ + (1  s)]  (3  )
X1 (2  s) ; p

2 = 
3 (1 + s)  
X2
(14)
A1 =
[ + (1  s)] (   1)
X1 (2  s) ; A

2 =
(1 + s) (   (1 + s))
X2
; (15)
whereX2  X1+s [2 (3   1)  s] :Whenever the TV channels second-order
conditions in Country 2 hold, we have X2 > 0.
Adding pi and Ai we nd that the generalized prices equal
g1 =
[ + (1  s)] (4   2   1)
X1 (2  s) and g

2 =
X2   2 (1 + s))
X2
: (16)
If the consumers are not allowed to buy from abroad, we know from equa-
tion (11) that the generalized price is higher in Country 1 than in Country
2 (g1 > g

2), such that we will have s > 0 in a no segmentation equilibrium.
If all non-loyals buy from Country 2 (s = 1), we have g1  g2 : However, if
only a share of them do so, the generalized prices in the two countries must
be the same, g1 = g

2 : Only then can we have 0 < s < 1 in equilibrium.
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Let us rst characterize equilibrium in the special case where s = 1:
All non-loyals in Country 1 buy from abroad ( s = 1)
A necessary requirement for having an equilibrium where all non-loyals
in Country 1 shift to Country 2 is that g1  g2 : Inserting for s = 1 into
equation (16) we nd that this holds if and only if
  ^  X1 (4  8 + 
2)
X3 (1  4 + 2) ; : (17)
where X3  12   2   4:
With s = 1; it follows from equations (14) and (15) that A2 > 0 require
 > 2; while p1 > 0 requires  < 3: Equations (14) - (16) thus hold only
when  2 [2; 3] :
For  2 [1; 2] ; where A2 = 0; we have
p2 = g

2 =
1
2
; (18)
in which case g1  g2 is true if and only if
    X1
2 (4   1  2) : (19)
Note that the equilibrium in Country 1 is independent of whether the market
in Country 2 is one-sided or two-sided.
It is straight forward to show that  = ^ at  = 2; and it is useful to
dene P   for   [1; 2] and P  ^ for   [2; 3] : This allows us to
state:
Proposition 4 Assume no segmentation and that  > P : Then g1 >
g2 ; and all non-loyals buy from Country 2 ( s = 1). Suppose that
a)  2 [1; 2] : Then the platform in Country 2 is one-sided ( p2 > 0;
A2 = 0), while the platform in Country 1 is two-sided ( p

1 > 0; A

1 > 0)
b)  2 (2; 3) : Then the platforms in both countries are two-sided ( pi >
0; Ai > 0).
Proposition 4 is illustrated in Figure 1, where the upward-sloping curve
shows P (): Beneath this curve we have s 2 (0; 1) ; so that no segmenta-
tion generates international price equalization (see further discussion below).
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Both platforms will then be two-sided.12 However, above the curve P ()
the generalized price is higher in Country 1 than in Country 2, and only for
 > 2 will both countries have a two-sided market structure.
Figure 1: Market structures with no segmentation
To see why the curve P is upward-sloping, consider an arbitrary point
(0; P (0)): By denition we have g1 = g2 at any point along this curve, so
that the marginal switcher is indi¤erent as to which country he buys from.
Assume that he buys from Country 2. Now, suppose that  increases. Then
the advertising market becomes more protable, and both TV channels will
have incentives to reduce the generalized viewer price in order to attract a
12Along the boundary TV2 has equally large populations of foreign and domestic view-
ers, and nds it optimal set A = 0: If s < 1; there is a larger number of domestic than
foreign viewers, and it is then optimal to set A > 0: Thus, it is only for s = 1 that there
might exist an equilibrium where the market is one-sided in Country 2. However, if the
number of foreign viewers is greater than the number of domestic viewers (e.g. because
Country 1 is "large"), then we might have a one-sided market also for s < 1:
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larger audience. However, since only domestic viewers have any value on
the advertising market, the relative importance of the advertising market is
smaller in Country 2 than in Country 1. But this means that we must have
g1 < g2 subsequent to an increase in . Thus, it cannot be rational for all
non-loyals to buy from Country 2 any more, unless also  increases (such
that Platform 1 uses a higher mark-up than it did initially).
Some non-loyals in Country 1 may buy at home ( s  1)
Let us now open up for the possibility that not all non-loyals buy from
Country 2; s  1. We then nd that no segmentation has the following
consequences (independent of whether the market in Country 2 is one-sided
or two-sided and independent of the value of s):
Proposition 5 Assume a shift from complete to no segmentation. Then
a) the monetary as well as the generalized price increase in both countries
( pi > p

i and g

i > g

i ).
b) the advertising level increases in Country 1 and decreases in Country
2 (A1 > A

1 and A

2 < A

2).
Proof: Consider rst the consequences of a shift from complete market
segmentation ( s = 0) to a no segmentation equilibrium where not all non-
loyals buy from Country 2 ( s < 1): Using equations (14) - (16) we have13:
dp1
ds
=
 (3  ) (   1)
(2  s)2X1
> 0 and
dp2
ds
= 
2s (3  ) + 3 (1 + s2) +  (3   2)
X22
> 0
dg1
ds
=
(   1) g1
(2  s) (1  s+ ) > 0 and
dg2
ds
= 2
2   (1 + s)2
X22
> 0 (20)
dA1
ds
=
2 (   1)  2   (1 + s)2
(4   2   1)X22
> 0 and
dA2
ds
=   5s
2 + 2 (5  ) s+ (2   2 + 5)
X22
< 0:
This proves Proposition 5 for s < 1: By setting s = 1 into equations (14)
- (16) and comparing with equations (10) - (11) it follows straight forwardly
that the Proposition holds also for the case where all non-loyals buy from
Country 2. Q:E:D:
The results that pi > p

i ; g

1 > g

1 and A

2 < A

2 are in accordance with
Propositions 2 and 3 for the general model, while the results that g2 > g

2
and A1 > A

1 conrm Conjecture 1.
13Note that 2   (1 + s)2 > 0 as long as A2 > 0; which always holds if s < 1:
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Equation (20) shows that the generalized price in both countries is always
increasing in the share of non-loyals in Country 1 who buy in Country 2.
Figure 2, which measures the generalized prices as functions of s, provides
an illustration for a specic set of parameter values ( = 1:2;  = 2:5).
Figure 2: Price consequences of no segmentation
No segmentation unambiguously increases prices in both countries, and
more so in the country which initially has the lower price level. An important
implication of this is that no segmentation - where consumers are allowed to
switch - harms the consumers if s < 1 in equilibrium. Clearly, the higher
generalized prices in the two countries harm those who buy at home both
before and after we open up for switching and thereby for international trade.
However, also those who switch must be harmed. The reason is that we
cannot have an equilibrium where s < 1 unless g1 = g2: But it then follows
that the loyals as well as the non-loyals pay a higher generalized price once
we allow for international trade.
Actually, we can say more than this. By denition we have g1 = g2 and
s = 1 along the curve P in Figure 1. A shift to a no segmentation regime
which brings the economy to this boundary must therefore involve a discrete
positive jump in prices for all the consumers. By continuity, the same must
be true also in some neighborhood above the curve. The only agent that
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gains from international trade in this area, is TV2. Thus, since the higher
generalized prices increase the deadweight loss on the consumer side of the
market in both countries, it is not surprising that aggregate welfare (i.e, the
sum of consumer surplus and prots in the two countries) falls once we open
up for international trade if we are in the neighborhood of (; ) = (; ()):
This is formally proved in the Appendix:
Proposition 6 Below, and in the neighborhood above, the curve P ();
the non-loyals lose when they are allowed to buy from abroad, and aggregate
welfare falls.
Note that if non-loyals in Country 1 could coordinate their actions, they
would not buy from abroad to such an extent that they must pay a higher
generalized price than in absence of trade. In this sense the negative outcome
is a result of a prisoners dilemma situation.
Proposition 6 does not imply that international trade is necessarily neg-
ative in our context. On the contrary, it improves welfare if  is su¢ ciently
high (and in particular so high that s = 1 and g1 > g

2 ). This is because
the price the switchers have to pay in the completely segmented market is
then very high; the non-loyals would even be excluded if  were high enough.
In the Appendix we therefore derive a boundary W () above which no seg-
mentation is preferable from a welfare point of view. The result is shown in
Figure 3; below the curve W international trade is detrimental to welfare.
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Figure 3: Welfare e¤ects of no segmentation.
5 Some concluding remarks
In this article we have shown that restrictions on rmsabilities to segment an
integrated market into national markets can be more detrimental to welfare
in a two-sided market than in a corresponding one-sided market. When con-
sumers are allowed to switch to a neighboring country it creates a mismatch
between the two sides of the market and a less e¢ cient market structure.
Even those switching by purchasing from the neighboring country might be
worse o¤.
Although our modelling is motivated by the organization of the TV rights
for Premier League, it raises questions about other similar types of markets.
For example, many types of TV programs are sold at di¤erent prices in
di¤erent countries and are partly nanced by commercials. Our analysis
suggests that one should be very careful when intervening in that type of
market, since it can violate the two-sidedness and thereby be detrimental
both for viewers and advertisers.
We have taken seriously the present competition law rules in EU con-
cerning vertical restraints, which are negative towards restrictions on passive
sales but lenient towards restrictions on active sales. This is modelled by
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allowing a downstream rm to serve a consumer that has switched from a
neighboring country (passive sales), but prohibiting the downstream rms
from competing for each othersconsumers (active sales). In this respect our
analysis is an illustration that the existing competition law rules on vertical
restraints are not well suited for two-sided markets. By allowing for passive
but not active sales, one prevents downstream competition and at the same
time allows for a mismatch between the two sides of the market.
The upstream rm could change the wholesale price to the downstream
rms and thereby trigger changes in end-user prices and the volume of ad-
vertising that would prevent any switching of consumers from one country
to another. But this could be interpreted as de facto the same as violating
the consumersoption to switch. If so, it might be a violation of competition
rules, as well as of the idea behind the common market. But despite this,
the upstream rm might pursue such a practice. Alternatively, the upstream
rm might decide to sell to only one instead of all EU countries and thereby
prevent passive sales. We leave these options for future research.
6 Appendix
6.1 Complete segmentation
6.1.1 No exclusion
Assume complete segmentation and that no consumer group is excluded.
Using equations (5) - (10) we then nd that consumption levels are given by
CA1 =
4   (   1) (4   1  2)
2X1
; C
B
1 = C
A
1 + (   1) ; C1 = ( + 1)
2
X1
C2 = C
A
2 =
2
X1
; (21)
where X1 = 6   2   1:
The prot levels are equal to
1 =
( + 1)2 
2X1
; 1 =
( + 1)2  (   1)2
2X21
(22)
2 =

6   2   1; 

2 = 
(   1)2
X21
22
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Using that consumer surplus for consumer group A in Country i = 1; 2
equals CSAi =
R CAi
0
 
1  CAi

dCAi = C
A
i

1  CAi
2

; with an analogue expres-
sion for consumer group B we further have
CSA1 =
((   1) (1 + 2   4) + 4) (4   ( + 3) (1 + 2   4))
8X21
;
CSB1 = CS
A
1 +
2   1
2
(23)
CSA2 =
2 (5   1  2)
X21
:
Dening welfare as the sum of consumer surplus and prots yields
W 1 =
2 + 92 + 9
16
+
( + 1)2 (   1)2 (34   5 (2 + 1))
16X21
; (24)
W 2 =
2 (7   (2 + 1))
X21
:
6.1.2 Exclusion of low-demand consumers in Country 1
It might be the case that it is optimal for the TV channel in Country 1
to serve only consumer group B under complete segmentation. A possible
exclusion of group A in Country 1 does not a¤ect the market outcome in
Country 2 when there is no trade, so the expressions derived in Section 4.1
for Country 2 still hold. We shall consequently focus solely on Country 1
below.
If the low-demand consumer group in Country 1 is excluded, we must
modify the advertisers prot function in that country to1 =
 
CB1   r1

A1:
Maximization with respect to A1 yields the following demand for ads
A1 =
   p1
2
  r1
2
: (25)
Solving @1=@p1 = @1=@r1 = 0 subject to (25) implies that the prices
and the advertising volume are equal to (with superscript E for exclusion):
pE1 = 
 (3  )
X1
; rE1 = 
 ( + 1)
X1
and AE1 = 
   1
X1
: (26)
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We now nd that
CE1 = 
2
X1
; CSE1 = 
22 (X1   )
X21
(27)
E1 = 
2 
X1
; E1 = 
2 (   1)2
X21
; WE1 = 
22 ((7  )    1)
X21
:
The outcome in Country 2 is still given by equations (21) - (24).
Using equation (10) we nd E1 = 
2 
X1
: Since E1 > 

1 for  > 
E 
1 +
p
2  2:41; we thus have an indication that above this critical value of
 the equilibrium prices are given by equation (26). A necessary condition
for this to be true is that the low-demand consumers will not watch TV at
these prices. However, inserting for (26) into (6) we nd
CA1 = max

0;
 
L    =L	 ; (28)
where L  X1
4 2 1 : It is now straight forward to show that 
L is monoton-
ically increasing in ; with L = 1 at  = 1 and L = 4 at  = 3:
Thereby equation ((26)) does not describe an equilibrium for su¢ ciently
high values of  (specically, at  = E we have CA1 > 0 if  > 
L p
14  8p2 p2 + 4

=2  2: 112 4): In order to derive the candidate equi-
librium in this case, it is useful to note that
AE1   A1 =
(   1) (   1)
2X1
> 0: (29)
Equation (29) has the interesting implication that the advertising volume is
highest in the case where the number of viewers is lowest, i.e. when only the
B-group watches TV (though the advertising price falls; rE1   r1 =   +1X1 <
0). This is in accordance with Conjecture 1.
The greater the advertisers benet of advertising, the more protable it
is for the TV channel to increase the advertising volume: This indicates that
if  is so high that CA1 in equation (28) is positive, then it might be protable
for the TV channel to nd a way of convincing the advertising market that
only the B group will watch TV. This it can do by setting the generalized
viewing price (g1 = p1 +A1) so high that the low-demand consumers do not
buy access to the TV programs. Then the advertisers will be willing to buy
more advertising space. In e¤ect, this implies that the TV channel might
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nd it protable to employ a limit-pricing strategy (superscript L) where the
prices are chosen such that CA1 is exactly equal to zero. Inserting for this into
equation (25) we nd A1 =
( 1) r1

and p1 =
r1 ( 2)

: Solving @1=@r = 0
then yields
pL1 = 1 
(   1) (   1)
2
; rL1 =
(   1) ( + 1)
2
and AL1 =
(   1) (   1)
2
;
(30)
which further implies that
CBL1 =    1; CSBL1 =
2   1
2
L1 =
   1
4
 (   1)2 +X1

; L1 =
(   1)2 (   1)2
4
;
WL1 =
(   1) ( (1 + (   1) +X1   )
2
:
Figure A1: Complete segmentation. Market outcome Country 1.
Figure A1 summarizes the discussion above, assuming that there exists an
equilibrium with complete segmentation. Below the (weakly) upward-sloping
curve in the Figure the di¤erence between the two groups in the willingness to
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pay for watching TV is so small that both groups will be served. The viewer
prices and the ad volume are then given by p1 and A

1 from equations (10)
and (11). Above the curve, on the other hand, the B group has such a high
willingness to pay for watching TV that the low-demand group is excluded
from the market. For  < L Platform 1 chooses its unconstrained prot-
maximizing prices pE1 and r
E
1 as given by equation (26), while for  > 
L it
engages in limit-pricing in order to exclude the low-demand group (pL1 and
rL1 ): It is straight forward to show that if the market we consider had been
one-sided (i.e. pure pay-TV), then group A would be excluded from the
market if and only if   E: This is the same outcome as we have in our
context if  < L: However, if  > L then it would be unprotable to exclude
group A from watching TV if  = E; this is due to the revenue they generate
in the advertising market. A higher value of  (greater di¤erence between
the groups) would then be required to make it protable for TV channel to
exclude group A. In this sense exclusion is less likely in a two-sided than in
a one-sided market.14
We can state:
Lemma 3 Assume complete market segmentation. Consumer group A in
Country 1 is excluded from the market if   L and   E: If  > L;
then group A is excluded only if  > L > E:
In the main body of the paper we restricted attention to the case where
no consumer group is excluded and where the platforms receive revenue from
both the consumer and advertiser side of the market if the markets are com-
pletely segmented. Letting U  E for   L and U  L for  > L; this
means that we implicitly made the assumption that  < U and  2 (1; 3) :
6.2 Proof of equations (14) and (15)
From equation (13) we nd that the solution to Ai = argmaxi is given by
A1 =
[ + (1  s)]  p1 (2  s)
2 (2  s)  
r1
2 (2  s) and A2 =
1  p2
2
  r2
2
: (31)
14It can be shown that E > L >  in the relevant area. The result that E > L is
quite natural, since the rm has one degree of freedom less with limit-pricing compared to
unconstrained prot-maximization. The rm will thus employ limit-pricing in the relevant
area only when CA1 otherwise would be positive.
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Inserting for (31) into (12) and solving @i=@pi = @i=@ri = 0 yields equation
(14) and (15).
6.3 No segmentation equilibrium with A2 = 0;  2
[1; 2] :
Equation (15) does not hold for  < 2; since that would imply a negative ad-
vertising level in Country 2. Maximizing prots for the platform in Country
2 under the restriction that A2 = 0 and s = 1; we nd
p2 =
1
2
; (32)
which further implies that
CAi =
1
2
; CSAi =
3
8
; 2 =
1
2
: (33)
Prots in Country 1 and consumer surplus for consumer group B are inde-
pendent of whether the market in Country 2 is one-sided or two-sided, and
using equations (13), (14) and (15) we have
CB1 =
2
X1
; CSB1 =
22 (5   1  2) 
X21
; (34)
1 =
2
X1
; 1 =
2 (   1)2
X21
:
Equations (33) and (34) imply that welfare equals
W 1 =
22 (7   2   1)
X21
+
3
8
and W 2 =
7
8
: (35)
There are two conditions that must be fullled for this to be an equilibrium.
First, all non-loyals must prefer to purchase in Country 2, and the platform
in this country must make a higher prot by being advertising-free than by
setting the prices that apply in an equilibrium with complete segmentation
(in which case we have a two-sided market in both countries). Using that
g2 = p

2 = 1=2 for  2 [1; 2] while g1 =  4 1 
2
X1
for  2 [1; 3] ; c.f. equation
(16), we nd that g2 < g

1 in the relevant area if a > ; where  is given by
equation (19). For  2 [1; 2] we further have 2   2 = 4 1 
2
2X1
> 0; so that
both conditions are fullled whenever a > .
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6.4 No segmentation equilibrium with A2 > 0;  2
(2; 3) :
In the no segmentation equilibrium where the market is two-sided in both
countries and s = 1 we have r1 =
(+1)
X1
and r2 =
2(+2)
X3
; with viewer prices
given by equation (14). Using this we nd CAi = 4=X3 and C
B
1 = 2=X1:
This implies that consumer surplus and prots are equal to
CSAi =
4 (10   2   4)
X23
;CSB1 =
22 (5   2   1) 
X21
1 =
2
X1
; 2 =
4
X3
1 =
2 (   1)2
X21
; 2 =
4 (   2)2
X23
:
Summing consumer surplus and prots we arrive at
W1 =
22 (7   2   1)
X21
+
4 (10   2   4)
X23
(36)
W2 =
4 (18   2   4)
X23
6.5 Proof of Proposition 6
The boundary P () is given by ^() and () from equations (17) and (19)
for   2 and   2; respectively.
For  > 2 we have
(  2) = g2   g1 =
4   2   1
2X1

X1X3   62 (4  )
X3 (4   2   1)   

:
If this di¤erence is positive, the switchers face a higher generalized price if
they purchase in Country 2 than if they are not allowed to do so. Inserting
for the boundary value,  = ^(); we nd
((  2)j=^() =
 (2   2)
X1X3
> 0:
For   2 we likewise have
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((  2)j=() =
(   1)2
4X1
> 0:Q:E:D:
6.6 Derivation of the boundary W
Welfare in the two countries under complete segmentation is given by equa-
tion (24). Under no segmentation welfare is given by equation (35) for  < 2:
Let (A2 = 0) measure welfare under no segmentation minus welfare under
complete segmentation. Using equations (24) and (35) we nd:
(A2 = 0) > 0 if  > 1()  1 + (   1)
s
34   5 (2 + 1)
8 (2 + 1)  (4 + 1)  102 :
Using equations (24) and (36) we similarly nd
(A2 > 0) > 0 if  > 2()  1+4
s
 (2   2) (3 (2   1) + (3 +X3)X1)
X23
 
8 (   1)2 + 62   4   1 :
The curve W () is given by 1() for   2 and by 2() for   2:
References
[1] Anderson, S.P. and S. Coate (2005), "Market Provision of Public Goods:
The Case of Broadcasting", Review of Economic Studies 72, 947-972.
[2] Anderson, S.P. and J.J. Gabszewicz (2006), "The Media and Advertis-
ing: A Tale of Two-Sided Markets", in: Handbook of the Economics
of Art and Culture (V. Ginsburgh and D. Throsby, eds.), Elsevier, pp.
567-614.
[3] bla bla
[4] Armstrong, M. (2008): Price discrimination, in Handbook of Antitrust
Economics (P. Buccorossi, ed.), MIT Press.
[5] Barros, P. P., H.J. Kind, T. Nilssen, and L. Sørgard (2004), "Media
Competition on the Internet", Topics in Economic Analysis and Policy
4, article 32.
29
SNF Working Paper No 31/12
[6] Callauid, B. and B. Jullien (2003): Chicken & Egg: Competition among
intermediation service providers, RAND Journal of Economics, 34, 309-
328.
[7] Danaher, P. (1995), "What Happens to Television Ratings During Com-
mercial Breaks?", Journal of Advertising Research 35, 37-47.
[8] Evans, D.S. (2003a), "The Antitrust Economics of Two-Sided Markets",
Yale Journal on Regulation 20, 325-381.
[9] Evans, D.S. (2003b), "Some Empirical Aspects of Multi-Sided Platform
Industries", Review of Network Economics 2, 191-209.
[10] Gabszewicz, J. J., D. Laussel, and N. Sonnac (2004), "Programming
and Advertising Competition in the Broadcasting Industry", Journal of
Economics and Management Strategy 13, 657-669.
[11] Jeon, D.S., B. Jullien and M. Klimenko (2012), Language, Internet and
Platform Competition: The case of Search Engines, IDEI working paper
742, September 2012.
[12] Kind, H.J., T. Nilssen, and L. Sørgard (2007), "Competition for Viewers
and Advertisers in a TV Oligopoly", Journal of Media Economics 20,
211-233.
[13] Kind, H.J., T. Nilssen, and L. Sørgard (2009), "Business Models for
Media Firms: Does Competition Matter for How They Raise Revenue?",
Marketing Science 28, 1112-1128.
[14] Liu, Q. and K. Serfes (2010), Price discrimination in two-sided markets,
mimeo, University of Oklahoma.
[15] Moriarty, S. E. and S.-L. Everett (1994), "Commercial Breaks: A View-
ing Behaviour Study", Journalism Quarterly 71, 346-355.
[16] Rochet, J.-C. and J. Tirole (2003), "Platform Competition in Two-Sided
Markets", Journal of the European Economic Association 1, 990-1029.
[17] Stole, L. (2007): Price discrimination and imperfect competition, in
Handbook in Industrial Organization, Volume 3 (M. Armstrong and R.
Porter, eds.), Elsevier.
30
SNF Working Paper No 31/12
[18] Varian, H. (1985): Price discrimination and social welfare, American
Economic Review, 75, 870-875.
[19] Varian, H. (1989): Price discrimination, in Handbook in Industrial
Organization, Volume 1 (R. Schmalensee and R. Willig, eds.), Elsevier.
[20] Weyl, E. G. (2010), "A Price Theory of Multi-sided Platforms" Ameri-
can Economic Review, 100, 164272.
31
SNF Working Paper No 31/12
E t  s e l s k ap  i  NHH -m i l j ø e t
S A M F U N N S -  O G  
N Æ R I N G S L I V S F O R S K N I N G  A S
I n s t i t u t e  f o r  R e s e a r c h  i n  E c o n o m i c s  
a n d  B u s i n e s s  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n
Breiviksveien 40 
N-5045 Bergen
Norway
Phone: (+47) 55 95 95 00
Fax: (+47) 55 95 94 39
E-mail: publikasjon@snf.no
Internet: http://www.snf.no/
Trykk: Allkopi Bergen
This paper analyzes market segmentation in a two-sided market that consists of 
media consumers and advertisers. The analysis is motivated by a European Court 
of Justice Decision in October 2011, which allowed viewers to take advantage of 
international price differences and buy access to Premier League TV matches from 
whichever country they like. We compare complete market segmentation with the 
new situation where consumers can purchase from abroad (allowing for passive 
sales). Clearly, such a change is likely to harm Premier League, which at present is 
sold at different prices to viewers in different countries. More surprisingly, we find 
that all viewers – including those that switch to purchasing from abroad - might also 
be harmed. We further show that the two-sidedness of the market may break down 
in the country that attracts foreign viewers.
